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Teaching for Epidemiological Literacy: Description, 
Prescription, and Critical Thinking 
 
Peter J. Taylor 
Science in a Changing World graduate track 
University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125, USA  
peter.taylor@umb.edu 
 
Abstract 
This working paper describes contrasting ideas for a sequence of topics as presented to 
students in a graduate course on epidemiological literacy.  The premise of the 
pedagogical approach is that researchers develop their epidemiological thinking and 
practice over time through interactions with other researchers who have a variety of in-
practice commitments, such as to kinds of cases and methods of analysis, and not 
simply to a philosophical framework for explanation.  In descriptively teasing out what 
epidemiologists do in practice through a topic-by-topic presentation, I am prescriptively 
encouraging discussants to draw purposefully from across the range of topics and 
contrasting positions, and thereby pursue critical thinking in the sense of understanding 
ideas and practices better when we examine them in relation to alternatives.  The initial 
topic concerns ways to learn in a community; after that, a number of conceptual steps 
follow—the characterization of the very phenomena we might be concerned with, the 
scope and challenges of the field of epidemiology, the formulation of categories—before 
linking associations, predictions, causes and interventions and examining the 
confounding of purported links.  Building on that basis, the remaining topics consist of 
issues or angles of analysis related to the complexities of inequalities within and 
between populations, context, and changes over the life course.  In the course of the 
description, some assertions about explanation and intervention emerge, notably, that 
epidemiological-philosophical discussion about causality often leaves unclear or 
unexamined whether a modifiable factor shown to have been associated with a 
difference in the data from past observations should be thought of as factor that, when 
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modified, would generate that difference going forward.  The article ends with 
conjectures that concern heterogeneity and the agency of the subjects of epidemiology. 
 
Keywords: causality, critical thinking, description-prescription, heterogeneity, inequality, 
intervention  
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Introduction 
To undertake philosophy of epidemiology is—or should be—to get involved in 
relationships between description and prescription that arise at four levels (Stegenga 
2009).  First: when do the patterns that epidemiologists detect in observations of illness 
measures and other variables warrant action to change those variables—and by whom 
and how?  Reciprocally, in what ways do ideas about actions favored by clinicians or 
health policymakers shape the kinds of patterns that get looked for.  Then, at a second 
level, how much is philosophy of science about what epidemiologists do in practice 
versus what they leave unclear or under-examined, which philosophers try to resolve or 
shed light on?  The latter effort implies that the views or practices of scientists can be 
improved, so—the third level—by what means do philosophers envisage that their 
accounts can influence researchers?  Finally, whether the accounts made by 
philosophers are descriptive or prescriptive, explicit about the means of effecting 
change in science or not, by what means do philosophers of epidemiology envisage 
influencing others in their own field to change their views or practices? 
 
Integrating the four levels of description and prescription can be straightforward if 
philosophy of epidemiology focuses on explanation and views soundness of explanation 
in terms of what I shall call an interventionist model of causality.  That is, of the many 
factors possibly associated with the outcome of interest, one is modified in a randomly 
chosen subset of the population; the other factors—including ones that may not be 
modifiable—vary randomly across all subjects.  When the focal factor is shown to be 
statistically significantly associated with the outcome, then clinical practice or health 
policy should modify the factor going forward.  This model obviously links description to 
prescription at the first level.  With respect to the other levels: philosophers who resolve 
or clarify issues about such explanations and about interventionist causality could 
expect to influence epidemiologists because the latter want their work to contribute 
ways to improvements in health; by extension, these philosophers would expect to 
influence colleagues who want their philosophical work to influence epidemiologists 
and, through them, people’s health.  
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This article does not, however, focus on explanation or interventionist causality.  
Instead, it describes contrasting ideas for a sequence of topics as presented to students 
in a graduate course on epidemiological literacy.  (Epidemiology here refers not to the 
dynamics of disease epidemics, but to the analysis of data from populations with a view 
to identifying the biological and social influences on the development of diseases and 
behaviors.)  The initial topic concerns ways to learn in a community; after that, a number 
of conceptual steps follow, starting with characterization of the very phenomena we 
might be concerned with, leading up the making and confounding of explanations and 
causal claims.  Building on that basis, the remaining topics consist of issues or angles of 
analysis related to the complexities of inequalities within and between populations, 
context, and changes over the life course (see Box below). 
 
Sequence of Topics 
1. The course as a learning community 
2. Phenomena: Exploring the natural history of disease 
3. The scope and challenges of epidemiology 
4. Categories 
5. Associations, Predictions, Causes, and Interventions 
6. Confounders and conditioning of analyses 
7. Variations in health care 
8. Heterogeneity within populations and subgroups 
9. Placing individuals in a multileveled context 
10. Life course epidemiology 
11. Multivariable "structural" models of development 
12. Heritability, heterogeneity, and group differences 
13. Genetic diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, and surveillance 
14. Popular epidemiology and health-based social movements; Taking Stock of Course: 
Where have we come and what do we need to learn to go further? 
(The body of the article provides entry points to these topics.  The full set of readings 
and other course materials, with links to instructional aids and options for contributions 
from non-students, are viewable at http://ppol753.wikispaces.umb.edu/Visitors.) 
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The premise of this pedagogical approach is that students who are becoming 
researchers will continue to develop their epidemiological thinking and practice over 
time through interactions with other researchers who have a variety of in-practice 
commitments, such as to kinds of cases and methods of analysis, not simply to a 
philosophical framework for explanation. The literacy this course aims for, then, is one 
in which discussions about how to proceed in epidemiology draw purposefully from 
across the range of topics and contrasting positions.  Literacy then is about critical 
thinking in the sense of understanding ideas and practices better when we examine 
them in relation to alternatives (Taylor 2002). 
 
In descriptively teasing out through a topic-by-topic presentation of what epidemiologists 
do in practice, I cannot avoid being prescriptive.  The implication is that researchers—
not just students becoming researchers—would benefit from discussions that draw from 
across the range of topics and contrasting positions.  Let me concede, however, that if I 
were designing a new course now, it might take the form of a semester-long unpacking 
of the recent article by two leading social epidemiologists, Krieger and Davey Smith 
(2016).  It seems plausible that epidemiologists would be more likely to change their 
practice after hearing from epidemiologists who are philosophically informed but also 
pragmatic about what balance to strike between referring to what epidemiologists do 
versus to what they need to clarify or do differently.  That possibility speaks also to the 
fourth level of description-prescription.  I am not prepared to argue that my account of a 
course, which makes little use of the specialized literature or philosophical terminology, 
is the best way to convince philosophers of epidemiology, who probably expect some 
focused argument that takes on the focused arguments of others, especially about 
explanation and causality.  My hope nonetheless is that philosophers and 
epidemiologists will, reading in the spirit of critical thinking, understand their 
expectations and practices better when they consider them in relation to the alternative 
exposition that this article represents.  
     
If fostering critical thinking seems a modest goal, some stronger positions about the first 
level of description-prescription emerge.  Most notably, it is often the case that 
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epidemiological-philosophical discussions about causality (including Krieger and Davey 
Smith 2016) leave unclear or unexamined whether a modifiable factor shown to have 
been associated with a difference in the data from past observations should be thought 
of as factor that, when modified, would generate that difference going forward.  Another 
proposition that emerges concerns heterogeneity and the relationship between the 
patterns detected by epidemiologists and actions warranted by them.  The closing 
section highlights the two propositions and opens up some conjectures that 
epidemiologists—and philosophers who descriptively and prescriptively discuss 
epidemiology—might examine more further. 
 
Terminological note: Unless specifically noted otherwise, the terms factor and variable 
are used in this article in a non-technical sense simply to refer to something whose 
presence or absence can, at least in principle, be observed or whose level can be 
measured.   Whether or not the factor or variable can be modified is a separate matter. 
 
The Course: Epidemiological Thinking and Population Health 
 
Week 1. The course as a learning community 
Idea 1.1: Developing epidemiological literacy requires: a. collaboration with others (of 
differing skills and interests; b. reflection on personal and professional development; 
and c. establishing practices of learning from material we do not fully grasp at first 
reading or hearing. 
Idea 1.2: Non-specialists need to become comfortable with the fundamental ideas and 
basic vocabulary of epidemiology in order to converse intelligently with specialists in 
epidemiology and biostatistics. One way to move in that direction is to practice making 
the ideas accessible to the layperson. 
 
Let me elaborate on these ideas and the implied contrasts (as I will do for each of the 
weeks/topics to follow).  The term epistemology may denote a focus on what makes 
beliefs in a specific knowledge claim justified, but it may also connote examining the 
processes through which knowledge gets established.  In either case, epistemology 
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may seem to presume a confident individual knower.  However, with its emphasis on 
developing epidemiological literacy, the course acknowledges that the processes 
through which knowledge or understanding gets established for an individual may be 
enhanced by attention to the tentativeness, cooperation, and communication. 
 
2. Phenomena: Exploring the natural history of disease 
Idea: Detailed observation (like naturalists make) or detective work—albeit informed by 
theoretical ideas—may be needed before we can characterize what the phenomenon is 
we are studying, what questions we need to ask, and what categories we need for 
subsequent data collection and analysis. 
 
Analysis of data enters quickly in standard epidemiology texts, whether they are 
positioned at the accessible level of, say, Gordis (2013), or the advanced level of 
Rothman et al. (2012).  But epidemiology need not begin with data sets to analyze. 
There may be exploratory, investigative, detective, anthropological, and naturalist 
inquiries before phenomena are even noticed, categories are defined, and questions 
are framed.  Work to define phenomena is illustrated well by John Snow’s famous use 
of maps to detect associations between cases of cholera in London in 1854 and water 
pumps, which supported his view that the infection spread through water not bad air 
(miasma) and his closing off the water supply from certain pumps.  Snow, it should be 
noted, had clear hypotheses that guided his mapping; his action certainly did not follow 
from simply noticing patterns in the data and hypothesizing about the causes (Brody 
2000).  In short, defining phenomena is not a simple matter of induction, which raises 
the perennial question for philosophy of science of where hypotheses that get assessed 
by research come from in the first place. This question can be fruitfully explored through 
further examples of phenomena-defining work provided by Allchin (2013) on Eijkman’s 
investigations of beriberi, Barker (1971) on buruli disease in Uganda, Oxford (2005) on 
teasing out the diverse factors that, in conjunction, led to the 1918 flu pandemic, or 
Cohen (2014) on chronic kidney disease of unknown etiology. 
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3. The scope and challenges of epidemiology 
Idea 3.1: The uses of epidemiology are many, but shift over time, and are subject to 
recurrent challenges from inside and outside the field. 
Idea 3.2: In advising on the most effective measures to be taken to improve the health 
of a population, epidemiologists may focus on different determinants of the disease than 
a doctor would when faced with sick or high-risk individuals. 
 
Morris (1957) is a pioneering text in the kind of epidemiology discussed in this paper, 
namely, concerning the “systematic approach to the population aspects of non-
communicable disease” Davey Smith (2001).  In identifying seven uses of epidemiology 
(see Box below), Morris also invites us to consider whether epidemiology is a single 
thing to examine and whether or why the currently dominant approach, namely, #7, is 
the best focus for philosophical attention.   
 
Epidemiology is the only way of asking some questions in medicine, one way of asking 
other [questions] (and no way at all to ask many). Seven ‘uses' of epidemiology have 
been described: 
1. In historical study of the health of the community and of the rise and fall of 
diseases in the population; useful ‘projections' into the future may also be possible. 
2. For community diagnosis of the presence, nature and distribution of health and 
disease among the population, and the dimensions of these in incidence, 
prevalence, and mortality; taking into account that society is changing and health 
problems are changing. 
3. To study the workings of health services. This begins with the determination of 
needs and resources, proceeds to analysis of services in action and, finally, 
attempts to appraise. Such studies can be comparative between various 
populations. 
4. To estimate, from the common experience, the individual's chances and risks of 
disease. 
 9 
5. To help complete the clinical picture by including all types of cases in proportion; 
by relating clinical disease to the subclinical; by observing secular changes in the 
character of disease, and its picture in other countries. 
6. In identifying syndromes from the distribution of clinical phenomena among 
sections of the population. 
7. In the search for causes of health and disease, starting with the discovery of 
groups with high and low rates, studying these differences in relation to differences 
in ways of living; and, where possible, testing these notions in the actual practice 
among populations. 
 
Brandt and Gardner’s (2000) historical account shows that physicians have often 
opposed an increasing role for public health and, by extension epidemiology. 
Epidemiology might be valued for quantitative assessment of new interventions and 
evaluating patient safety and healthcare quality (fitting under Morris’s use #3), but its 
role beyond evaluation and assessment, especially in regards to social, cultural, and 
economic factors influencing diseases, has continued to be contested.  At the 
conceptual, more than sociological, level, the contest is between treatment of sick or 
high-risk individuals and taking population-wide measures to reduce the frequency of 
such individuals (Rose 1985 and commentaries in Ebrahim and Davey Smith 2001).   
 
Alcohol consumption and road accidents provide a good illustration of Rose’s “sick 
individuals-sick populations” contrast.  Perhaps you have been able to get home safely 
even after drinking too much, but we also know that a substantial fraction of people in 
road accidents have high alcohol levels.  Some people seem more susceptible to 
having their judgement and reaction times impaired by alcohol, but drink-don’t-drive 
campaigns are directed at everyone; they are population-wide measures.  It is easy, 
however, to imagine a formula to assess an individual’s risk of accident that factors in 
not only the proximate alcohol consumption, but also background factors of, say, visual 
acuity, gender, age, driving with teenage passengers, cell phone habits, alcohol 
dehydrogenase gene variants, etc.  More refined assessments of riskiness could, in 
principle, help focus risk-prevention efforts on high-risk individuals.  Yet, we might ask, 
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would the net benefit (benefits minus costs) be significant relative to that from drink-
don’t-drive efforts?  Indeed, in a society that had eliminated driving after drinking, 
discovering which genes might confer some susceptibility to alcohol among drinkers 
would be irrelevant to reduction in road accidents.  Then again, as a political or 
sociological matter, would campaigns directed at everyone be allowed to go so far as to 
achieve the goal of no driving after drinking? 
   
As an illustration of the idea of making epidemiological thinking accessible to the 
layperson (#1.2), note how the Rosean contrast and its implications arise in popular 
debates outside the health field.  Following shooting rampages in the USA, Rosean risk 
reduction is put forward in a number of disparate forms: restricting availability of 
automatic weapons; providing less publicity to individuals who claim that they have to 
arm themselves against the tyrannies of the government; improving mental health 
funding so that help would be given to distressed individuals; and so on.  For each 
proposed method, questions arise: would it be practical?  …politically feasible?  
…effective?  How would policy address fractions of the population (e.g., so-called 
“responsible gun owners”) who see no benefit from the population-wide risk reduction 
and even harm?  Discussions often shift from population responses to the notion that 
rampages are the work of deranged individuals.  Yet, if the focus were to be on high-risk 
individuals, why are medical practitioners discouraged (or even prohibited) from 
discussing whether guns are accessible in the households of their patients?      
 
Returning to challenges to the uses of epidemiology (#3.1), challenges within the field 
occur at regular intervals, especially around the contrast Pearce (1996) identifies as 
“bottom-up” versus “top-down” approaches. The latter begins at the population level in 
order to determine the primary socioeconomic factors that effect health.  Bottom-up 
approaches, e.g., molecular epidemiology, begin on the individual level and aim to 
proceed upward toward explaining population level patterns.  Description parallels 
prescription in the contrast between political engagement to change the macro-factors 
and physician or patient responsibility in relation to an individual’s modifiable risk 
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factors. (See also Putnam and Galea 2008 and McMichael’s 2011 review of Krieger’s 
2011 Epidemiology and the People’s Health.) 
 
4. Categories 
Idea: Collecting and analyzing data requires categories: Have we omitted relevant 
categories or mixed different phenomena under one label? What basis do we have for 
subdividing a continuum into categories? How do we ensure correct diagnosis and 
assignment to categories? What meaning do we intend to give to data collected in our 
categories? 
 
The theme that epidemiology does not begin with data sets to analyze (#2.1) is 
extended by the idea and questions above.  The definition of categories shape the 
observations that can be made, the data collected from the observations, the 
associations or patterns perceived in the data, and so on.  For example, early on in 
Galton’s lifelong collection of data on human traits of many and varied kinds, he decided 
not to record “those that were imposed by the circumstances of their… lives” and focus 
on the “effects of tendencies received at birth” (Galton 1875, 566).  The patterns of 
similarity he detected among relatives may have been sound, but only allowed for 
hypotheses and patterns about biological, not social inheritance, and spoke only to his 
prescriptive interests in the area he called eugenics (Taylor 2008).  Closer to the 
present, Poland (2004) rejects the category of schizophrenia as defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (and elsewhere).  Making use of such a category to 
describe patients makes it harder, he argues, for a clinician to pay attention to the 
contextual and life history information of patients.  Even the milder position that the label 
schizophrenia is an umbrella term for heterogeneous conditions obviously has 
implications for investigation to expose the genes that influence “schizophrenia” (see 
#12 and 13 below). 
 
Teasing out the assumptions along the chain of steps in scientific inquiry—from all 
possible phenomena that could be inquired into through categories demarcated, to 
observations made using those categories, to actions supported by predictions or to 
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causal claims—is obviously a matter for philosophical attention.  Because the 
assumptions are not always dictated by the phenomena or justified by the results, 
teasing out the steps invites attention to the negotiations and wider influences that 
shape how the steps end up being made (Taylor 2005, 33-46; 2008).  When we observe 
philosophers focusing on the logic but not the sociologic of the steps they observe 
epidemiologists making, we could well inquire into the prescriptive interests they might 
be enacting (i.e., the third level of description-prescription in the introduction). 
 
Let me note three specific category choices that have prescriptive implications.  First, 
incidence—new cases per unit time—versus prevalence—the caseload at any point of 
time.  The public health burden of say, Alzheimer’s dementia, is related to its 
prevalence; for epidemiologists to focus on its incidence is to imply that identifying risk 
factors for incidence can lead either to public health measures or other policies to 
reduce those factors in the population or to biomedical research that would trace and 
ultimately disrupt the pathways from the risk factor to the disease.  Second, the choice 
to focus on the absolute incidence of an illness or on the relative incidence, in which 
one group is compared with another.  Measures and policies to reduce the risk factors 
for absolute incidence may save lives even though the inequality among groups persists 
(Lynch et al. 2006; see #6 and 7 for further discussion).  Finally, the seemingly 
mundane descriptive issue of how well the observations are made in the category 
chosen (e.g., rounding off blood pressure to the nearest 5mm Hg) animates various 
disputes in epidemiology about prescriptively relevant associations (Huxley et al. 2002; 
see #10).   
 
5. Associations, Predictions, Causes, and Interventions 
Idea: With respect to the relationships among associations, predictions, causes, and 
interventions that run through most cases and controversies in epidemiology, the field 
has two faces: One from which the thinking about associations, predictions, causes, and 
interventions are allowed to cross-fertilize, and the other from which the distinctions 
among them are vigorously maintained, as in "Correlation is not causation!" The second 
face views Randomized Control Trial (RCTs) as the "gold-standard" for testing 
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treatments in medicine. The first face recognizes that many hypotheses about treatment 
and other interventions emerge from observational studies and often such studies 
provide the only data we have to work with. What are the shortcomings of observational 
studies we need to pay attention to? 
 
On this last question, examples such as the following kind are familiar: Being under 
treatment with statins was observed to be associated with lowered risk of dementia (Jick 
et al. 2000).  In subsequent prospective studies, however, use of statins at the outset 
was not associated with lower development of Alzheimer’s in the future (Zandi et al. 
2005). The discrepancy seems to be consistent with an unrecognized bias in which 
elderly patients in the original study had been prescribed statins—patients with 
undiagnosed dementia were less likely to receive treatment.  An even stronger check on 
results from observational studies are RCTs (Lawlor et al. 2004), as illustrated when the 
Women’s Health Initiative clinical trial reported that hormone therapy increased rather 
than decreased the risk of coronary heart disease in women.  
   
The use of RCTs builds in the interventionist model of causality defined in the 
introduction.  To reiterate: Of the many factors possibly associated with the outcome of 
interest, one is modified in a randomly chosen subset; the other factors—including ones 
that may not be modifiable—vary randomly across all subjects.  The same model of 
causality also informs Mendelian randomization (Davey Smith and Ebrahim 2007), but 
here nature modifies the factor in a randomly chosen subset.  Is there an association 
between, for example, levels of cReactive Protein (CRP) in the blood and coronary 
heart disease (CHD) for people who have a rare genetic variant that leads to life-long 
elevated CRP levels, but otherwise vary randomly on other risk factors for CHD (such 
as smoking, bodymass index, and blood pressure)?  (Notice that the interventionist 
model in epidemiology differs from typical experiments in the laboratory, in which the 
background factors are controlled, not randomly varying, across replicates of the 
experimental intervention.) 
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Ambiguity regarding causality is obvious in the common term for variables associated 
with an outcome of interest, risk factor.  The term has connotations of interventionist 
causality, of something that, if altered, reduces risk.  However, associations with risk 
factors can allow for clinically useful predictions even when those factors are not 
modifiable, such as age or gender, and even when modifying the level of the factor does 
not improve the outcome.  For example, Ridker et al. (2007) propose a composite of risk 
factors for CHD in women, the Reynolds Risk Score, that improves on the conventional 
Framingham score, primarily, it seems, by including CRP levels.  “Improve” here means 
fewer women assigned to the medium or low-risk categories had subsequent coronary 
events; by implication, clinicians could feel more confident in focusing their attention on 
individuals assigned to the high-risk category.  Not surprisingly, researchers such as 
Ridker became interested in the idea that intervening to reduce CRP could improve 
CHD outcomes.  Mendelian randomization subsequently cast doubt on that hypothesis 
(C Reactive Protein Coronary Heart Disease Genetics Collaboration 2011), yet the 
clinical value of the Reynolds Risk Score remains. 
 
The phrase “not surprisingly” used above betrays the common expectation when a 
factor is associated with an outcome, typically as significant variable in some kind of 
regression equation, it is a plausible candidate for inclusion in explanations or 
hypotheses about interventionist causality.  It may be noted, however, that, at the very 
foundations of fitting regression equations to data lies two alternative pictures (Weldon 
2000).  The first is that the so-called independent variables are combined in the 
regression equation to provide the best prediction of the dependent variable (and thus 
become the plausible causal candidates above).  The second picture follows from 
seeing that, for the simplest case of one variable used to predict a second, the slope of 
the regression line when the two variables are scaled to have equal spread (standard 
deviation) is the same as their correlation; this value is also a measure of how tightly the 
cloud of points is packed around the line of slope 1 (or slope -1 for a negative 
correlation). Technically, when both measurements are scaled to have a standard 
deviation of 1, the average of the squared perpendicular distance from the points to the 
line of slope 1 or -1 is equal to 1 minus the absolute value of the correlation (Weldon 
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2000). This means that the larger the correlation, the tighter the packing. This tightness-
of-packing picture of correlation—and, by extension, of regression equations—affords 
no priority to one measurement over the other in prediction.  This second picture means 
that a good predictor is not in itself a basis for the causal plausibility of a variable; linking 
prediction and causality must depend on considerations beyond the statistical analysis 
of data.  
 
A looser alternative to the interventionist model of causality is to view statistical analysis 
as identifying differences that make a difference.  In this model, the differences—
typically departures of a factor from a mean value—need not be modifiable (e.g., 
chromosomal sex is a commonly measured but non-modifiable genetic factor).  
Moreover, if the factors were modifiable, it does not follow that modifying them would 
generate the differences observed in the original data set.  In other words, it does not 
follow that the difference that “makes” a difference as exposed by statistical analysis of 
data (outside RCTs and Mendelian randomization) is a factor one can modify to make 
the same difference again.  For example, lower income level is a significant factor 
associated with smoking rates, but there is no reason to expect that disbursing $10,000 
to poor smokers would lead many of them to quit.  After all, the dynamics through which 
a person develops a low income and the dynamics through which a person becomes a 
smoker are separately and jointly far more complex than any static statistical, 
differences-that-make-a-difference model can capture.  (Obviously this reservation does 
not apply to RCTs, but it might well apply in Mendelian randomization given that, if, say, 
the genetic variant inducing lifelong elevated CRP levels had been associated with 
CHD, modifying CRP for future patients would be by means other than giving them that 
variant at birth.) 
 
A curious prescriptive implication is shared by both the interventionist and the statistical, 
differences-that-make-a-difference models.  When a significant result becomes the 
basis for practice or policy, variation around the mean gets discounted.  For example, 
imagine a comparison of the dental health of two communities that have the same 
range of health problems except that the one with naturally high level of fluorides in its 
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water supply has better than average dental health.  In each community there will be 
variation around the average dental health.  However, if the variation is small relative to 
the differences in the two averages, it might seem reasonable to advocate fluoridation of 
water supplies lacking natural fluoride.  In doing so the variation around the average is 
discounted (as are other deviations from type, such as teeth discoloration that occurs in 
some individuals).  The alternative would be for tablets to be taken by each individual, 
which would allow the dosage to be customized according to a person’s dental health 
habits and disposition.  This individual approach is not preferred by most public health 
policy-makers, who point to lack of "compliance" when individuals are responsible for 
administering their own preventative medicines.  Discounting of variation around the 
mean could, however, trouble epidemiologists and population health researchers.  
Consider, for example, the persistent differences on average in various scholastic 
achievement tests between so-called racial groups.  When researchers set out to 
explain these average differences are they assuming that educators will treat individuals 
according to the average of the group to which they belong?  This question might even 
lead us to ask what exactly is meant by trying to explain a difference between the 
means of two groups.  (See Davey Smith 2011 and Taylor 2014a for contrasting 
positions on whether and when to discount heterogeneity in favor of average differences 
between groups; see #8 and 12.) 
 
6. Confounders and conditioning of analyses 
Idea: Statistical associations between any two variables generally vary depending on 
the values taken by other potentially "confounding" variables. We need to take this 
dependency or conditionality into account when using our analyses to make predictions 
or hypothesize about causes, but how do we decide which variables are relevant and 
real confounders? 
 
The descriptive moment in conditioning of analyses simply envisages the observations 
as divided into slices, each slice containing only observations that share the same value 
(or range) of a given variable, such as age.  We do not want the comparison of two 
groups to be distorted by one group having a larger fraction in some slices (finding, say, 
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women to be at a greater risk for Alzheimer’s dementia without noting that women are a 
larger fraction of older age classes), so the statistical analysis is run on a data set in 
which, in effect, the number of observations in each slice are balanced out.  Perhaps 
the comparison would be different if we focused on each slice separately, but typically 
the analysis averages those separate comparisons into a single conditioned or adjusted 
comparison.  
 
The prescriptive moment in conditioning of analyses emerges in disputes around 
adjustments not made or inappropriate adjustments, in which the implication is that 
actions that might be supported by the unadjusted or inappropriate adjustments are not 
justified.  In these contexts, the term confounder or confounding variable is typically 
used.  The original association between hormone replacement therapy and lowered 
CHD incidence, for example, was supported by studies that did not adjust for the on-
average higher socioeconomic status (SES) of the women receiving the therapy.  In that 
light, prescribing the therapy across all SES should not be expected to result in 
comparable lowering of CHD incidence for all (Petitti 2004); indeed that turned out to be 
the case.  On inappropriate adjustments, Davey Smith et al. (1997) see elimination of 
the socioeconomic gradient in CHD incidence by statistical adjustment for self–reported 
job control as, in effect, an adjustment for SES given that low job control is associated 
with lower SES.  Lynch et al. (2006) argue that the focus on the psychosocial factors 
(such as on job control) diverts the focus of health promotion away from the 
conventional risk factors (smoking, hypertension, dyslipidemia [unhealthy cholesterol 
levels], and diabetes), attention to which can reduce the absolute amount CHD 
incidence even if a socioeconomic gradient (i.e., its relative amount) were to persist.  
(The claim of unjustified adjustment is central to Huxley et al.’s [2002] critique of 
associations between early life experience and chronic adult disease [see #10 below]; 
but see Davies et al. [2006].) 
 
Under the interventionist model of causality, it is clear how to show whether actions that 
might be supported by the unadjusted or inappropriate adjustments are justified.  RCTs 
and Mendelian randomization demonstrate that a variable is a confounder if its 
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association with the outcome of interest disappears when it is modified in a subset of 
subjects while all other relevant factors vary randomly across all subjects.  In the 
schema below, an instrumental variable (I.V.) would be the presence of the drug being 
tested or the control (in RCTs) or the rare genetic variant versus the normal variant (in 
Mendelian randomization).  In both cases the I.V. is associated with the outcome only if 
it influences X (the effect of the drug or the rare variant).  The I.V. is not associated with 
any other variable that is or might be associated with X or the outcome.  
 
      
Notice that both the effect of a modifiable factor (I.V. -> X) and statistical associations 
are represented by arrows.  The use of such diagrams to decide whether adjustment is 
appropriate revolves around bringing in qualitative, a priori, subject-matter knowledge of 
causal connections  (Hernán et al. 2002) even when there is no obvious instrumental 
variable, that is, even for the broader class of statistical, differences-that-make-a-
difference analyses.  Whether, in practice, this extension discounts the kinds of issues 
about causality mentioned in topic #5, such as, what it means to explain a difference 
between averages across two (or more) groups, warrants philosophical attention.  
Moreover, description can underwrite prescription even without giving causal 
interpretation (of either type) to statistical associations.  The use of the Reynolds Risk 
Score (Ridker et al. 2007; see #5) in effect separates the slices that have high from 
those that have low levels of CRP; it has the potential to improve the assignment of 
people to high, medium, or low risk for CHD and thus the effectiveness of preventative 
measures. 
 
* * * 
Building on the preceding topics, the rest of the course takes up issues or angles of 
analysis related to the complexities of inequalities within and between populations, 
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placing individuals in context, changes over the life course, and heterogeneous 
pathways.  Before moving forward, let me acknowledge a contrasting approach, namely 
circling back around explanation following the article mentioned in the introduction, 
Krieger and Davey Smith (2016).  They argue—and illustrate—that epidemiology needs 
to make use of a diversity of methods to determine the causal connections that are 
relevant to making policy and changing practice.  In noting the “need to amass 
substantive expertise and to generate and think critically about contrastive hypotheses,” 
these epidemiologists (who are cited often under the topics above or below) align their 
position with the advocacy by philosopher of science Lipton of inference to the best 
explanation. 
 
7. Variations in health care 
Idea: Inequalities in people's health and how they are treated are associated with place, 
race, class, gender; these inequalities may persist even after conditioning on other 
relevant variables.   
 
Concern about inequalities in health among groups lies at the center of social 
epidemiology. (See Krieger 2010a for a detailed overview of a course on inequalities 
and health.)  Any descriptive account of inequalities can readily be given a prescriptive 
interpretation.  For example, after finding that “[f]or virtually all outcomes, risk increased 
with CT [census tract] poverty,” Krieger et al. (2005) note that “[f]or half the outcomes, 
more than 50% of cases would not have occurred if population rates equaled those of 
persons in the least impoverished CTs.”  The prescription-by-counterfactual (technical 
term: population attributable fraction [PAF]) does, however, leave the how and by whom 
of the health-income improvement as a separate matter.   
 
Indeed, the how of the disease-poverty association need not be obvious.  Alter et al. 
(1999), for example, show that in Ontario where there is universal health insurance, 
access to specialized cardiac services is associated with SES even after statistically 
adjusting for factors corresponding to the reasonable assumption that specialist doctors 
and higher quality facilities would tend to be located in higher SES areas.  What other 
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factors then are associated with the unequal access?  Wright et al.'s (2004) study of 
asthma among children in low-income urban settings, after adjusting for SES and 
caretaker behaviors, such as smoking, found asthma to be associated with stress and 
exposure to violence.  Krieger et al. (2005) shows the association of health inequalities 
with race or ethnicity is reduced after adjustment for socioeconomic deprivation (CT 
poverty), but not eliminated.  Searching for associations that pertain specifically to race 
and ethnicity has led to results such as those of Mustillo et al. (2004) in which higher 
risk of pre-term delivery of babies to African-American women, was associated, after 
adjusting not only for income but also for alcohol and tobacco use, depression, and 
education, with income reported experience of racial discrimination.    
 
As noted earlier (#4, 6), Lynch et al. (2006) question the value of research to pin down 
risk factors for the SES gradient in health when measures and policies already exist to 
reduce the major risk factors for absolute incidence; those measures and policies need 
to be the priority.  A logical extension of their argument would be to question the value 
of research to pin down risk factors for gradients in health remaining after adjusting for 
SES when addressing the major risk factor, lower SES, needs to be the priority (see 
e.g., Krieger at al. 2005’s conclusion above).   The obvious counter-argument might be 
that while measures and policies to reduce smoking, hypertension, and so on seem 
feasible to Lynch and colleagues—they lie in the realms of clinical practice and health 
promotion—substantial reduction in SES inequalities lies beyond the ambit of 
epidemiology and seem difficult, even if important, especially given the political 
economic changes over the last 40 years that continue to enlarge such inequalities.  In 
this argument, prescriptive assumptions shape the descriptive exercise of finding 
statistical associations. Similarly, even if research pinned down risk factors for gradients 
in health remaining after adjusting for SES, which in the USA might include specific 
features of racial discrimination, measures to change the dynamics producing, say, that 
discrimination may seem as difficult as they are important.  Yet, a counter to this 
counter-argument might be that, when descriptive accounts of such associations are not 
available, it is harder to bring the unfairness or injustice of health inequalities to bear in 
the prescriptive realm of politics and policy making.   
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The preceding discussion of inequalities not only introduces contrasts in how to interpret 
variation in health, but also points to issues that readily arise about how to measure and 
track health variations (#4).  The analysis of Krieger et al. (2005), for example, 
responded to the lack of socioeconomic data in US public health surveillance systems 
by geocoding records according to census tract, for which poverty rates were available.  
Krieger (2010b) acknowledges the social and historically changing definitions of race 
and ethnicity as well as the necessity of employing them if the ways that “racism harms 
health” are to be exposed.  Krieger (2014) notes that, even with the increase of studies 
that include experience of discrimination as a risk factor, the emphasis remains on 
person-person discrimination, not structural.     
 
8. Heterogeneity within populations and subgroups 
Idea: How people respond to treatment may vary from one subgroup to another. When 
is this a matter of chance or of undetected additional variables? How do we delineate 
the boundaries between subgroups? 
 
If subgroups are defined after exploring the data, there is an obvious risk that they are 
shaped with a view to finding a significant association with some outcome of interest 
(which was evident in the case of the purportedly race-specific medicine BiDil; Kahn 
2007).  More generally, as statisticians caution, the more subgroupings that are 
explored the more chance that a significant association will arise by chance; Lagakos 
(2006) recommends therefore tighter criteria for claiming that an association is 
statistically significant.  Ioannidis’s (2005) article has stimulated wider scrutiny of fishing 
to find and publish on associations that turn out to be false positives or, at least, hard to 
reproduce (so-called P-hacking). 
 
The opposite caution is that treating everyone as if they were from the same population 
(even if for good statistical reasons) distracts our attention from the clues that might 
lead to seeing ways that the population is not one uniform whole, but is a mixture of 
types or even more heterogeneous than that.  Heterogeneity can have health care 
 22 
implications.  For example, when breast cancers are subdivided according to the 
responsiveness of the tumor to hormones, there is a qualitative difference in 
effectiveness, on average, of different regimes of chemotherapy and tamoxifen (Regan 
and Gelber 2005).  Steinbach et al. (2014) examine the not-surprising association of 
lower injury from pedestrian accidents for children in affluent areas, but find that the 
association does not hold “for those in some minority ethnic groups."  If we widen further 
what comes under the umbrella of health, Fazel’s (2012) review of instruments used for 
making decisions about sentencing, release or preventative detention in the criminal 
justice system argues that, when low-risk and high-risk offenders are separated, the 
predictive value of the instruments turns out to be very poor for the high-risk offenders.  
 
Notwithstanding the preceding health implications of heterogeneity, Davey Smith (2011) 
warns against paying much attention to it (and against putting much hope in 
personalized medicine): considerable randomness at the individual level means that 
epidemiology should keep its focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population 
level.  Taylor (2014a) counters or complicates the advice of Davey Smith with examples 
and arguments showing that: a) it can be quite reasonable to try to differentiate among 
individuals so as to improve risk prediction, even if finding ways to do so may not be 
straightforward; and b) when researchers think about the causal dynamics underlying 
patterns in data (such as associations with risk factors), it may be helpful not to view 
deviations from patterns as noise but as invitations to pay attention to the multiplicity of 
paths to the “same” trait and to other forms that heterogeneity takes (see also #10 and 
the closing section of this article).     
 
9. Placing individuals in a multileveled context 
Idea: Different or even contradictory associations can be detected at different levels of 
aggregation (e.g., individual, region, nation), yet not all influences can be assigned to 
properties of the individual.  Membership in a larger aggregation may be associated with 
outcomes even after conditioning on the attributes that individual members have. 
 
Associations at the level of nations between incidence of a disease, say, breast cancer, 
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and a given risk factor, say, dietary fat intake suggest associations at the level of 
individuals: among women who consume more fat we might expect there to be a 
greater incidence of breast cancer.  Such ecological inference suggests, in turn, advice 
to women: reduce your dietary fat intake.  Alternatives to the obvious inference need, 
however, to be considered.  Perhaps dietary fat is associated, say, with higher standard 
of living and some other aspects of affluence can also be shown to be risk factors.  Not 
only such confounding variables, but also alternatives that point in the opposite direction 
to the original suggestion may need to be identified and examined.  Barker and Osmond 
(1986), for example, studied patterns in CHD, which is associated with increasing 
prosperity of a country and, by inference, with some risk factor(s) for individuals that had 
increased with affluence.  In England, however, CHD turned out to be highest in districts 
that had poorest conditions for health, as measured by infant mortality 55 years earlier 
(see #10 for discussion of associations across the life course).   
 
Scrutiny of suggestions is also needed when the aggregate-level variables have no 
equivalent for individuals.  In an encyclopedia entry on ecological inference, Freedman 
(2001) showed that in 1995 U.S. states with higher fraction of foreign born tended to be 
the ones with higher fractions of higher income.  An individual cannot be fractionally 
high income or fractionally foreign born, yet the association across states might be 
taken to suggest that the foreign born tend to have higher incomes.  The inverse turned 
out to be the case.  Finally, when individual-level associations are not as clear as 
association for aggregate-level variables, it may be worth scrutinizing whether the latter 
subsume a heterogeneity of conditions (#8) experienced by individuals (see, e.g., 
Khodarahmi and Azadbakht 2014 in relation to the dietary fat-breast cancer 
association).  This last situation points to one of the difficulties of making inferences in 
the opposite direction—from risk factors at the individual level to risk factors associated 
with health differences among units at some level of aggregation above the individual.  
Indeed, for each situation in this and the previous paragraph, alternatives to the obvious 
inferences from individuals to aggregate units should be considered.   
 
Hierarchical linear modeling address the problem of inferences across levels by, in 
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effect, examining an association within a group, say, CHD incidence in relation to an 
individual’s income within a neighborhood or census tract, and then comparing the 
slopes and intercepts of the resulting regression equations across the groups.  The 
nesting of individuals into groups is seen to be relevant if the slopes and intercepts are 
significantly different (Diez Roux 2002).  Interpretation of significant differences in terms 
of some modifiable quality of the aggregate units, such as the number of playgrounds in 
a neighborhood, is difficult and contested (Oakes 2004), all the more so if proposed 
interpretations involve aggregate-level variables with no equivalent for individuals, such 
as income inequality within the neighborhood, or “complex causal chains with feedback 
loops and reciprocal effects” (Diez Roux 2002, 516).  To reprise an earlier point, the 
dynamics through which income inequality evolves in a neighborhood and through 
which individuals’ health or disease develops in their neighborhoods are more complex 
than any static statistical, differences-that-make-a-difference model can capture—
certainly more complex than addressed by social science experiments of the kind that 
would, say, fund new playgrounds after finding an association between childhood 
obesity and the number of playgrounds in a neighborhood. 
 
The importance—and complexity—of analyzing health in a multilevel context is 
illustrated by the study of Friedman et al. (2014), which found that a) population density 
of HIV+ people who inject drugs was positively associated with the density of non-
injecting drug users; b) HIV prevention programs for people who inject drugs was 
negatively associated with “AIDS incidence among heterosexuals and… mortality 
among heterosexuals living with AIDS” several years later, but c) there was no such 
associations for HIV+ men who have sex with men.  The authors recommend more 
research on how the non-injecting drug users may serve as a bridge between other 
populations and thus how interventions in one key population affect HIV epidemics in 
other populations.  
 
10. Life course epidemiology 
Idea: How do we identify and disentangle the biological and social factors that build on 
each other over the life course from gestation through to old age? 
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The finding of Barker and Osmond (1986) mentioned earlier, that CHD turned out to be 
highest in districts of England that had poorest conditions for health as measured by 
infant mortality 55 years earlier, opened up inquiry into the fetal or early life origins of 
chronic adult diseases.  Mechanisms were suggested involving adaptation of fetal 
growth to undernutrition at different phases of gestation, with subsequent confirmation 
in experiments on animals (Barker 1998).  For humans, it is difficult to isolate the 
association between a disease in later life and conditions during gestation or early life 
given that such conditions tend to be associated with similar conditions during childhood 
and beyond (Ben Shlomo and Davey Smith 1991).  Researchers who conducted large-
scale clinical trials or large observational studies of factors that could be modified in 
adult life were especially strong in their criticisms (Huxley et al. 2002; but see Davies et 
al. 2006).  The fetal origins hypothesis had the potential to distract attention from 
demonstrable life-extending changes in adult life, such as smoking cessation and 
cholesterol-lowering use of statins.  Yet, if transitions across generations (e.g., rural to 
urban migration, public health measures, nutritional improvements) that influence the 
nutrition mothers are able to provide their fetuses as well as the subsequent conditions 
for the offspring could be shown to be associated with the rise and subsequent decline 
in CHD incidence in a country (Barker 1987, 1999), the result would be relevant to 
understanding epidemiological patterns even if it did not translate into clear clinical 
recommendations. 
 
The challenge raised by the fetal origins hypothesis was to assemble health data across 
the life course and develop methods to discriminate among factors from different stages 
with respect to their association with diseases in later life.  For example, establishing 
whether factors at one stage build on those of earlier stages or influence later disease 
separately (as would occur if there were specifically sensitive periods).  This challenge 
was taken up by the field that emerged as life course epidemiology (Ben Shlomo and 
Kuh 2002; Davey Smith 2007).   
 
An earlier line of research, initiated by the medical sociologists Brown and Harris in the 
late 1960s (Harris, 2000), employs a different and labor-intensive method to investigate 
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the role of factors from different periods of the life course.  They combine wide-ranging 
interviews, ratings of transcripts for the significance of past events in their context (with 
the rating done blind, that is, without knowledge of whether the person became ill), and 
statistical analyses to investigate how severe events and difficulties during people’s life 
course are associated with the onset of mental illnesses.  An event, such as death of a 
spouse, might have very different meanings and significance for different subjects 
according to the context, which Brown and Harris’s methods accommodate (see #4). At 
the same time, apparently heterogeneous events can be subsumed under one factor, 
such as, in explanation of depression, a severe, adverse event in the year prior to onset 
(see #4 and 8).   For example, in the earliest work of Brown and Harris concerning a 
district of London in the early 1970s, they identified four factors as disproportionately the 
case for women with severe depression: a severe, adverse event in the year prior to the 
onset of depression; the lack of a supportive partner; persistently difficult living 
conditions; and the loss of, or prolonged separation from, the mother when the woman 
was a child under the age of 11 (Brown & Harris, 1978, 1989b) (see #9).  In principle, 
even if results turned out to be specific to a given place, such an integration of “the 
quantitative analyses of epidemiology and [in] depth understanding of the case history 
approach” (Brown & Harris, 1989a, p. x) could be taken up more widely in epidemiology 
(Brown & Harris 1989b). 
 
11. Multivariable "structural" models of development 
Idea: Just as standard regression models allow prediction of a dependent variable on 
the basis of independent variables, structural models can allow a sequence of predictive 
steps from root ("exogeneous") through to highest-level variables. Although this kind of 
model seems to illuminate issues about factors that build up over the life course, there 
are strong criticisms of using such models to make claims about causes. 
 
This idea is well illustrated by the work of Kendler and colleagues, who examine 
behavioral traits in relation to a wealth of factors or variables over the life course 
(Kendler and Prescott 2006). In Kendler et al. (2002), for example, data on over 1,900 
twins are used to fit the incidence of major depression to a model that incorporates 
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many environmental factors and a so-called “genetic risk” factor. (This last factor is 
derived from the incidence of major depression in the co-twin and parents, with 
adjustments made for the degree of relatedness of the twins; monozygotic versus 
dizygotic; see #12). This kind of path analysis or Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
does not simply look for how the trait is associated with each of the factors, but 
quantifies their relative contributions (“path coefficients”) to the variation in the focal trait 
once a certain network of the factors has been specified. Some of these contributions 
are direct and others are mediated through other factors, i.e., indirect (Lynch & Walsh 
1998, 823).  Kendler’s model accounts for 52% of the variance in the incidence of major 
depression and provides a picture of development that is rich and plausible.  For 
example, a path coefficient of .7 from neuroticism to low self-esteem and of .3 from low 
self-esteem to low education suggests that neuroticism makes it more likely that a 
person has low self-esteem and that, in turns, makes it more likely that they do not 
pursue education as far as others. 
 
In one sense, interpretation of these paths is no different than for any other statistical 
analysis under a differences-that-make-a-difference model: no claim need be made that 
a given factor can be modified and if it were that the model would predict the outcome.  
In another sense, having paths pointed in one direction and calling the networks of 
linked factors “structural”—or my describing the picture of development in Kendler’s 
model as “plausible”—suggests stronger causal claims.  But, where Pearl (2000, 135 
and 344-5) sees path analysis in terms of variables that can be manipulated through 
their insertion or removal, Freedman (2005) argues against viewing path analysis/SEM 
models in interventionist terms: the equations (i.e., the coefficients and error terms) 
would have to be “stable under proposed interventions” and that this is difficult to verify 
without making the interventions.  If the equations change when factors are 
manipulated, they have “only a limited utility for predicting the results of interventions” 
(matching the point made in #5).  Freedman’s skepticism may be seen to temper the 
call (see #9) of Diez Roux (2002, 516) for attention to “complex causal chains with 
feedback loops and reciprocal effects.” 
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Kendler et al. (2002, 1133) show admirable reserve about how to interpret their model 
(as does Ou [2005] in SEM modeling of pathways of educational development from pre-
school programs to later outcomes).  Nevertheless, to the extent that this kind of model 
is meant to illuminate issues about factors that build up over the life course, the 
exclusion of certain factors and inclusion of others has prescriptive implications.  The 
models of Kendler and colleagues, for example, do not include factors that correspond 
to therapeutic interventions or to social changes that have led to the rising incidence of 
depression.  Data on these factors may not have been available or collected (#2 and 3), 
but sensitivity of the analysis to inclusion or exclusion of such factors warrants attention 
given the potential prescriptive implications (see #12). 
 
12. Heritability, heterogeneity, and group differences 
Idea: As conventionally interpreted, heritability indicates the fraction of variation in a trait 
associated with "genetic differences." A high value indicates a strong genetic 
contribution to the trait and "makes the trait a potentially worthwhile candidate for 
molecular research" that might identify the specific genetic factors involved. A 
contrasting interpretation is that there is nothing reliable that anyone can do on the 
basis of estimates of heritability for human traits. While some have moved their focus to 
cases in which measurable genetic and environmental factors are involved, others see 
the need to bring genetics into the explanation of differences for certain traits between 
the averages for groups, especially racial groups. 
 
Partitioning of variation into fractions is the foundation of classical quantitative genetics, 
a field that arose in agriculture, where multiple varieties of plants can be grown in many 
plots in many locations.  For a given trait, say, yield per plot, the variation can be 
partitioned (through the statistical technique of Analysis of Variance and its kin) into 
three components and what is left over or residual: between the means for each variety 
when averaged across locations; between the means for each location when averaged 
across varieties; and between the means for each variety-location combination when 
averaged across plots (and after taking out the preceding two components).  Such 
partitioning is contingent on the specific set of varieties and locations.  Despite its name, 
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quantitative genetics neither relies on nor produces knowledge about specific genetic 
and environmental factors that might be causing the yield in each variety-location 
combination.  There is no obvious factor that could be modified under an interventionist 
model of causality. (This last point applies also to path analysis as used to partition 
variation; see #11.)  
 
The contingent, descriptive quality of partitioning of variation becomes obscured, 
however, after the following common moves are made: varieties are referred to as 
genotypes; the variation among the variety or genotypic means across locations is 
called genotypic variance; this term is shortened to genetic variance; that quantity is 
interpreted as the fraction of variation in a trait associated with "genetic differences”; 
that quantity is called “heritability”; and it is discussed as if it had some relation with 
heritable in the sense of the transmission of genes from parents to offspring. The origin 
of these moves can be traced to the models used by quantitative genetics to partition 
trait variation, which, in order to take different degrees of relatedness into account (e.g., 
monozygotic twins being more closely related than dizygotic twins), posit theoretical, 
idealized genes that have simple Mendelian inheritance and direct contributions to the 
trait.  (Given that the partitioning is of variation in traits, it must be possible to partition 
variation without using models of genes that are not observed [Taylor 2012]; such 
“gene-free” analyses have not been taken up in practice.) 
 
Two developments in quantitative genetics might seem to undercut any concern that the 
genes in its traditional models are not observables.  First, the technique of mapping 
quantitative trait loci (QTL) associates regions of the genome with variation in a 
continuously variable trait.  Although most success has been had in animal and plant 
varieties that can be replicated and raised in controlled conditions, QTL analyses for 
human populations are advancing (Mackay et al. 2009; but see reservations of 
Majumder and Ghosh 2005).  Second, in this age of genomics, it is possible to 
determine the presence or absence of actual genes and then, as epidemiology typically 
does, look for associations between variation in a trait and measured factors, in this 
case, levels of genes and environmental factors (Moffitt et al 2005).  In short, to the 
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extent that molecular research now identifies specific genes or regions of the genome 
underlying variation certain traits, a high heritability value (in the traditional sense) would 
seem a plausible indicator as any that “the trait [is] a potentially worthwhile candidate for 
[such] molecular research” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002, chapter 11). 
 
However, the plausibility of heritability as a guide for what to investigate at molecular 
level may be disturbed by heterogeneity (#8), in the following way.  Heritability (in the 
traditional sense) can be derived through partitioning of variation that employs data from 
relatives.  The similarity of pairs of monozygotic twins (which share all their genes) can, 
for example, be compared with the similarity of pairs of dizygotic twins (which do not 
share all their genes).  The more that the former quantity exceeds the latter, the higher 
is the trait’s heritability (assuming for purposes of discussion that monozygotic twins are 
not treated more similarly than are dizygotic twins).  Even if the similarity among twins 
or a set of close relatives is associated with similarity of (yet-to-be-identified) genetic 
factors, the factors may not be the same from one set of relatives to the next, or from 
one environment to the next.  In other words, the underlying factors may be 
heterogeneous.  It could be that pairs of alleles, say, AAbbcbDDee, subject to a 
sequence of environmental factors, say, FghiJ, during the development of the organism 
are associated, all other things being equal, with the same outcomes as alleles 
aabbCCDDEE subject to a sequence of environmental factors FgHiJ (Taylor 2012).  
Such underlying heterogeneity makes heritability an unreliable indicator of whether to 
study a trait with a view to exposing differences in actual genes associated with 
variation among variety or so-called genotypic means.  (If we put aside traits associated 
with so-called high-penetrance major genes, e.g., polydactyly, there are no obvious 
grounds to rule out the possibility of heterogeneity in the measurable genetic and 
environmental factors that underlie patterns in quantitative and other complex traits, 
such as crop yield, height, human IQ test scores, susceptibility to heart disease, 
personality type, and so on.) 
 
The possibility of underlying heterogeneity reminds us that statistical patterns such as 
the size of components of partitioned variation in a trait are distinct from measurable 
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underlying factors.  This reminder has become more necessary since, in recent years, 
the same term heritability has been co-opted to refer to a conceptually and empirically 
distinct quantity, namely, the fraction of variation in a trait associated with variation in 
Single-Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) as examined by an extension of QTL 
analyses, namely, Genome-Wide Association (GWA) studies.  It has turned out, 
however, that, for SNP loci where variants have a statistically significant association 
with some medically significant trait, that association corresponds to a small increase in 
incidence of the trait (McCarthy et al. 2008).  Moreover, even when many such 
associations are considered jointly, most of the variation in the trait remains 
unaccounted for (Ku et al. 2010).  The difference between high heritability in the 
traditional sense for, say, height, and the fraction of variation associated with SNPs (i.e., 
heritability in the new sense) led to discussions about so-called “missing heritability” 
(e.g., Zuka et al. 2012).  Underlying heterogeneity provides one explanation for why 
GWA studies have had difficulties in identifying causally relevant genetic variants 
behind variation in human traits (Taylor 2014b). 
 
When the presence or absence of actual genes can be determined and associations are 
found between variation in a trait and measured genetic and environmental factors, the 
distinction between statistical differences-that-make-a-difference and interventionist 
causality may get blurred.  Caspi et al. (2002), for example, reports on antisocial 
behavior in adults in relation to the activity of monoamine oxidase type A (MAOA) and 
childhood maltreatment; MAOA deficiency is a strong predictor of antisocial behavior 
only when the child has also been maltreated.  The authors conclude that their results 
“could inform the development of future pharmacological treatments.”  The obvious 
counter is that their results could also warrant more effort to reduce maltreatment of 
children.  In any case, epidemiologists have noted that the PAF is very low for the Caspi 
et al. study, that is, few cases of anti-social behavior would be eliminated if MAOA was 
at the normal level or maltreatment was not present.  Yet notice that, not only Caspi et 
al.’s conclusion, but also the critical responses rest on envisioning that the factors 
associated with the trait to be modifiable then assuming that modifying them would 
generate the differences observed in the original data set.  Attempts to modify the 
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factors, however, may well entail new and possibly counter-productive measures, from 
intrusion of social services agencies into households to stereotyping and surveillance of 
low MAOA individuals (Taylor 2015; see also #13).   
 
The possibility of finding associations between variation in a trait and measured genetic 
and environmental factors allows a further distinction to be made (or forgotten; Taylor 
2015).  A genotype- or gene-environment interaction in such studies means that the 
quantitative relation between the trait and one of the factors varies according to the 
measured value of the other factor.  In traditional quantitative genetics, however, a 
variety-location interaction or genotype-environment interaction is high when the 
responses of the observed varieties across the range of the observed locations do not 
parallel one another.  That is, one variety may be highest for the trait in one location, but 
another variety may be highest in another location-or, at least, the difference between 
any two varieties may change location to location.  Because the traditional quantitative 
genetics analysis of trait variation requires no reference to measured factors, the order 
of the varieties (or genotypes) and locations (or environments) is arbitrary and adds no 
information to the analysis.  Moreover, there is no reason for the relevant (but unknown) 
factors involved in the producing the trait to carry over from one variety-location to 
another.  In short, the two senses of genotype-environment interaction are not linked at 
a conceptual or empirical level.  There is no inconsistency, therefore, between claims of 
substantial human gene-environment interaction (for which there is an active research 
arena; National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 2017), and negligible 
genotype-environment interaction, at least for IQ test scores (according to the 
conventional wisdom in human quantitative genetics; Plomin 1977, but see Taylor 
2012). 
 
The distinction between the components of partitioned variation in a trait and 
measurable underlying factors has relevance to the perennially reemerging two-part 
hypothesis: high heritability values for human IQ test scores (Neisser et al. 1996, but 
see Turkheimer et al. 2003, Nisbett et al. 2012) coupled with a failure of environmental 
hypotheses to account for the differences between the mean scores for racial groups 
 33 
(but see Fryer and Levitt 2004) supports explanations of mean differences in terms of 
genetic factors (e.g., Jensen in Miele 2002, 111ff).  (The specific factors would still have 
to be elucidated, so “support” may be read as “lends plausibility to the belief that such 
genetic factors exist.”)  Yet, if statistical analysis of variation among traits, which 
includes heritability estimation, provides little or no guidance in hypothesizing about 
measurable factors underlying the observations within a population, then it can provide 
little or no guidance about measurable factors associated with differences between two 
groups.  (Strictly, differences between the means for the two groups.  Recall the earlier 
remark [#5] that, when a significant result becomes the basis for practice or policy, 
variation around the mean gets discounted.)  Moreover, contra Dickens and Flynn 
(2001), there is no paradox in finding high heritability for IQ test scores along with large 
differences in average score from one generation to the next (presumably unrelated to 
genetic changes).  The average group and generational differences still need 
explanations, but heritability studies provide no warrant to center hypotheses about 
these differences around differences in measurable genetic factors. 
 
13. Genetic diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, and surveillance 
Idea: Genetic analysis has begun to identify genetic risk factors. We need to consider 
the social infrastructure needed to keep track of the genetic and environmental 
exposures with a view to useful epidemiological analysis and subsequent healthcare 
measures. Even in cases where the condition has a clear-cut link to a single changed 
gene and treatment is possible, there is complexity in sustaining that treatment. 
 
Bowcock (2007) describes how a consortium of 50 British groups examined genetic 
variance in a GWA study.  In the search for genetic risk factors for seven common 
diseases, 500,000 SNPs were examined from the genomes of 17,000 individuals.  The 
number and scope of GWA studies continue to increase, but not so life course studies.   
Frank (2005) remind us that, surely environmental as well as genetic factors influence 
development of traits, but the cost to collect and store information about environmental 
exposures over the life course of individuals is much greater and it tends not to be 
collected.  Indeed, these days, even the collection of environmental data at a 
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community level seems vulnerable (Paris et al. 2017).  As noted earlier (#2 and 4), one-
sidedness of data in turn shapes the associations or patterns that can be perceived 
(description) and thus the measures that can be supported by epidemiological data 
(prescription). 
 
Even if the emphasis on GWA studies is accepted, standards for “presenting and 
interpreting cumulative evidence on gene-disease associations,” as Khoury et al. (2007) 
point out, are needed to reduce the frequency of unreplicable associations (false 
positives) that might derive from publication and selection biases, differences in 
collection and analysis of samples, and the presence of undetected gene-environment 
interactions (recalling #4-6).  While standards constitute infrastructure to help make 
research reliable, different kinds of infrastructure would be needed if it happened that a 
SNP loci identified by GWA studies led researchers to locate the genetic variant 
influencing the trait and then to identify a biochemical treatment to counter its effect. 
Paul’s (2013) account of the history and sociology of the poster-child case for genetic 
medicine, phenylketonuria (PKU) makes that clear.  Following routine screening of 
newborns and instituting of a special diet for individuals with PKU, the previous certainty 
of severe cognitive impairment has been replaced by a chronic disease with a new set 
of problems. There remains an ongoing struggle, at least in the USA, to secure health 
insurance coverage for the special diet and to enlist family and peers to support 
individuals with PKU staying on that diet through adolescence and into adulthood. For 
women who do not maintain the diet well and become pregnant, high levels of 
phenylalanine adversely affect the development of their non-PKU fetuses. This so-
called maternal PKU is a public health concern that did not previously exist.  Given that 
PKU is a simple case—a mutation in a single gene—health improvements through post-
natal genetic screening can only be more complicated.  What prescriptive idea, then, 
motivates the epidemiological search for associations between complex medical traits 
and variants at multiple sites on the genome (Taylor 2009)?  
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14. Popular epidemiology and health-based social movements 
Idea: The traditional subjects of epidemiology become agents when: a. they draw 
attention of trained epidemiologists to fine scale patterns of disease in that community 
and otherwise contribute to initiation and completion of studies; b. their resilience and 
reorganization of their lives and communities in response to social changes displaces or 
complements researchers' traditional emphasis on exposures impinging on subjects; 
and c. when their responses to health risks displays rationalities not taken into account 
by epidemiologists, health educators, and policy makers. 
 
The work of epidemiologists in looking for associations that have relevance for health-
related practice and policy is complicated by their subjects becoming agents.  For 
example, a. in popular epidemiology (Brown 2007) local residents use their experience 
and fine-grained knowledge to point to phenomena and categories (#2 and 4) in which 
to make observations and look for associations; b. when they change the social 
organization of their communities (Sampson 2012) thus altering the causal dynamics 
that researchers sought to illuminate on the basis of patterns in data (such as 
associations with risk factors) (#2 and 5); and c. when groups resist health promotion 
efforts, such as smoking-cessation programs, because of a lay epidemiology (Lawlor et 
al. 2003) in which individuals in lower SES groups assess the specific risk in relation to 
their wider life prospects (#2, 4, 7, 9, 10).  Studies of these and other ways in which 
subjects become agents may well result in patterns and variation among people that do 
not extrapolate readily over time, place, and scale.  Nevertheless such studies could still 
provide points of departure (see #2 and 4) for research and policy engagements in 
subsequent situations.  
 
14b. Taking Stock of Course: Where have we come and what do we need to learn 
to go further? 
Idea: In order to move ahead and continue developing, it is important to take stock of 
what went well and what needs further work. 
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If the initial session introduced various conditions that help in developing 
epidemiological literacy (#1), this final session allows us to plan ways to secure ongoing 
support beyond microcosm of the course. 
 
From Critical Thinking to Conjecture 
 
In descriptively teasing out what epidemiologists do in practice through the topic-by-
topic presentation, I have also had a prescriptive goal: to encourage discussants to 
draw purposefully from across the range of topics and explore contrasting positions.  
What phenomena, the critical-thinking student or researcher might ask their colleagues, 
have been overlooked?  What other ways are there to define the categories for making 
observations and detecting patterns?  Should we be interested in screening and 
treatment of sick or high-risk individuals or taking population-wide measures to reduce 
the frequency of such individuals?  How would our interpretations differ if we thought of 
regression equations in terms of tightness-of-packing, not goodness of prediction?  Why 
are we focusing on factors associated with the relative risk when measures and policies 
already exist to reduce the major risk factors for absolute incidence? And so on, from 
one topic to the next reviewed in the course and this article. 
 
It is possible that the reader or researcher disagrees with various positions or their 
description.  No problem; the premise of critical thinking (as I define it; Taylor 2002) is 
that we come to understand ideas and practices better when we examine them in 
relation to alternatives.  By extension, it does not matter if a position is currently 
espoused by few epidemiologists.  Indeed, some positions I include because I believe 
that epidemiologists—and philosophers who descriptively and prescriptively discuss 
epidemiology—should examine them more deeply.  Let me highlight two of these.  
 
As prefigured in the introduction, discussion about causality should distinguish between, 
on one hand, showing a modifiable factor to have been associated with a difference in 
the data from past observations and, on the other hand, expecting that factor, when 
modified, to generate that difference going forward.  This distinction applies to the 
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interventionist not only the statistical, differences-that-make-a-difference models of 
causality (see topics #5, 6, and the end of 12). More attention should also be given to 
the possibility of underlying heterogeneity (which informs my review of topics #4, 8, 9 
and 12).  That is, when similar responses of different individual types (i.e., values for the 
trait in question) are observed, it need not be the case that similar conjunctions of risk 
and protective factors have been involved in producing those responses.  Epidemiology 
has traditionally been allied with population health and its focus on modifiable causes of 
disease at the population level (Davey Smith 2011); nevertheless, researchers might 
want to consider alternatives to treating individuals according to the average of the 
population or group to which they belong (as noted for racial group average differences 
in educational measures; see end of #5). 
 
When are researchers troubled by heterogeneity? (Taylor 2014a,b)  Consider this story, 
which concerns heterogeneity in the simplest sense, namely, a group made up of two 
distinguishable subgroups.  At my annual physical when I turned 50 my doctor 
recommended a regimen of half an aspirin a day to help prevent a stroke or heart 
attack.  Not long afterwards I learned that some fraction of the population is resistant to 
aspirin—it does not produce the desired anti-platelet effect.  This subgroup is, however, 
still subject to aspirin resulting in an increased risk of serious gastrointestinal bleeding.  
Could I find out if I was in the resistant fraction?  My doctor informed me that health 
insurance companies do not consider testing to be a justified expense for healthy 
subjects.  It was, he advised, up to me to decide whether to take the daily aspirin.  
Some Internet follow-up on my part revealed that testing for resistance is possible, but 
is undertaken only when patients under treatment for a cardiovascular attack do not 
seem to be showing the anti-platelet effects of aspirin intake.  Would I devote energy to 
find others with similar concerns about their aspirin-resistance status and agitate for 
access to testing?  As it turned out, no—I went along with the health insurance 
company’s determination and followed the doctor’s advice to make a personal choice, in 
this case, not to take the daily pill. 
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With hindsight, my decision was a good one—recent research indicates that in all 
healthy subjects the decreased average risk of a cardiovascular event might not 
outweigh the increased average risk of gastrointestinal bleeding (Seshasai et al. 2012).  
Yet, these newer findings aside, consider my experience at the time.  In the doctor’s 
initial recommendation, aspirin-resistant and normal subgroups were treated as a single 
group of over-50s, all of us subject to the same positive trade-off between 
cardiovascular and gastrointestinal risks.  The doctor could have been troubled by the 
heterogeneity within this group, especially after I raised my concerns.  Instead he 
invoked both the rhetoric of patient choice and the constraints of the health insurance 
system.  I did entertain the possibility of joining with others to agitate for testing to 
determine which subgroup we belonged to.  In the end, I complied with my doctor’s 
framing of my position, namely, I should see myself as a member of an over-50s group 
subject to a degree of uncertainty about the positive trade-off. 
 
Three interrelated conjectures are illustrated by the story: 
•  Research and application of resulting knowledge are untroubled by heterogeneity to 
the extent that populations are well controlled—As the story conveys, my doctor wanted 
to treat me according to the average of the group I was a member of.  At first I did not 
comply with his recommendation, but I did accept his subsequent advice. 
•  Such control can be established and maintained, however, only with considerable 
effort or social infrastructure—The authority of medical professionals was not sufficient 
to achieve my compliance, but eventually the rhetoric of patient choice and the 
reimbursement guidelines of the health insurance system were. 
•  The interplay of heterogeneity, control, and social infrastructure provides an opening 
to give more attention to possibilities for participation instead of control of human 
subjects—The Internet gave me a means to go beyond the consultation with my doctor.  
From this first port of call, I could have embarked on a journey of finding whom to 
collaborate with to agitate for change in the guidelines for aspirin-resistance testing. 
 
Of course, my personal concerns about prophylactic aspirin do not constitute a key 
issue for epidemiology and population health.  Indeed, only at the end of the course do 
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the conjectures surface, when attention is drawn to social infrastructure (#13) and to 
subjects of epidemiology becoming agents (#14).  Moreover, there is ambiguity in the 
last topic about whether subjects as agents complicates or enables the work of 
epidemiologists in looking for associations that have relevance for health-related 
practice and policy.  A bolder position would be that epidemiologists should relax their 
focus on modifiable causes of disease at the population level, revising the scope of 
epidemiology (#3) and the methods used (#4-13) to allow subjects, living in specific 
situations that continue to change, to show researchers how they connect knowledge 
with action.  The patterns in variation among people derived from observations of 
communities where people are resilient and reorganize their health, lives, and 
communities in response to social changes (Sampson 2012) might not extrapolate 
readily over time, place, and scale, yet the patterns could provide a point of departure 
for research and policy engagements in subsequent situations that the researchers 
study.  This bolder line of inquiry and conjecture, when considered in tension with the 
current expectations and practices of epidemiologists, might allow them—and 
philosophers who descriptively and prescriptively discuss epidemiology—to understand 
those expectations and practices better. 
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